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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
In this paper we examine the use of carbon taxes to reduce emissions of CO 2 in China. To do so, we develop a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Chinese economy. In addition to accounting for the effects of population growth, capital accumulation, technological change, and changing patterns of demand, we also incorporate into our model elements of the dual nature of the Chinese economy where both plan and market institutions exist side by side.
After specifying the time paths of the exogenous variables used in the model, we run a "business as usual" baseline simulation that gives us estimates of GDP, carbon emissions, and other endogenous variables for the 40 years starting from the 1992 base year. Most analyses for developed countries look at the effects of stabilizing or reducing emissions below some target, such as 1990 levels. However, China and other developing countries have raised strenuous objections to attempts to get them to agree to these types of targets. Therefore, we instead simulate the effects of uniform emissions reductions of 5, 10, and 15% from our baseline. To do this we use the model to calculate a carbon tax rate that will hold carbon emissions to a given percentage of the baseline level. The imposition of the carbon tax raises additional revenue for the government. In order to keep the emissions reduction simulations revenue neutral, we reduce all other taxes proportionately.
We then compare the outcomes of the carbon reduction simulations with the baseline solution. Increasing the percentage reduction in emissions requires a more than proportionate increase in the per unit tax rate on a ton of carbon. In the case of a 15% reduction in carbon emissions, the imposition of sectoral carbon taxes on coal and oil results in an increase of 21 percent in the price of coal and a 3 percent increase in the price of oil in the 1st year. The imposition of the carbon taxes increases energy prices in general and this in turn increases the prices of other goods that use energy. Increases in prices result in a decline in the real wage and a fall in real household income. However, given our assumption that the labor supply in China is inelastic, the decline in the real wage does not have a distortionary effect on hours worked. At the same time, because of the reduction in taxes on enterprises, enterprise retained earnings are increased and this increase in retained earnings is transferred into an increase in investment. Over time, the increase in investment results in an increase in total output and, with a short lag, this is reflected in increases in consumption.
In all of the alternative scenarios, there is a very small decline in GDP in the 1st year of the simulation. However, in each case, GDP is increased in every year thereafter. In the 15% emissions reduction case, by the 30th year of the simulation, the level of GDP is increased by almost one percent over the baseline. Although subject to a number of caveats, we find potential for what is in some sense a "double dividend," a decrease in emissions of CO 2 and a long run increase in GDP and consumption.
Introduction
China's rapid growth since the beginning of economic reform in late 1978 has been accompanied by a rapid increase in the use of fossil fuels. Over this period, the rate of increase in the use of primary energy has been about 4 percent per year. While this is only about half the rate of increase in real national output, given the sheer size of the Chinese economy, this has led to emissions, in 1995, of some 870 million tons of carbon in the form of carbon dioxide, the main anthropogenic greenhouse gas. In the same year, by comparison, the world's largest emitter, the United States, generated an estimated 1.4 billion tons of carbon, while the world total was about 6.4 billion tons.
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Although there exist a wide range of plausible forecasts of future Chinese emissions, they are unanimous in predicting that China will become the world's largest emitter of CO 2 sometime within the next several decades. Our previous baseline projection, for example, puts China's annual carbon emissions at about 1.8 billion tons by the year 2020 (Ho, Jorgenson, and Perkins 1998) . Given the current interest in controlling global greenhouse gases, it is crucial to understand the workings of China's economy and its relationship to carbon emissions. In addition, there is great concern about the costs of any attempt at controlling these emissions. Is there a large tradeoff between environmental objectives and economic development? This question must be a central concern of policy makers in China.
In this paper, we discuss how carbon taxes might be used to reduce carbon emissions and the effect of such taxes on both total output and the output of individual sectors. Our goal is not only to examine the link between current fossil fuel use, carbon emissions reduction strategies, and costs in forgone output, but also to study the effects on economic growth and hence future emissions and costs. In previous work (Garbaccio, Ho, and Jorgenson 1997b) we examined the effects of economic liberalization on fossil fuel use. In this paper, we study the effects of carbon taxes on the choice of energy inputs, given a level of economic activity, and the effects of these policies over time on economic growth.
For this purpose we develop a dynamic economy-energy-environment model for China.
While the model abstracts from many aspects of this complex economy, it does contain a number of features we believe are essential for capturing the policy impacts we wish to assess. Previous studies have used numerical models to examine some of these issues (e.g. World Bank (1994) , Xie (1995) , Rose et al. (1996) , and Zhang (1998a Zhang ( , 1998b ). Like Ho, Jorgenson, and Perkins (1998) , the study by the World Bank (1994) employs exogenous forecasts of technology and demand patterns to provide a range of plausible forecasts of future greenhouse gas emissions.
Neither of these studies, however, attempts to estimate the effects of specific policies, such as carbon taxes, to control these emissions. Xie (1995) uses a CGE model to examine the effects of emissions taxes on pollution, including particulates, but excluding CO 2 . However, while Xie's model has detailed pollution control cost functions, they are specified within a static framework. Rose et al. (1996) use a linear programming model to examine the output cost of reducing carbon emissions. In their simulations, they compare two economies that are optimized at each level of carbon targets. They do not, however, have an explicit role for prices and ignore the "nonoptimizing" features of the Chinese economy, such as the residual elements of the planned economy and credit controls. Zhang's (1998a Zhang's ( , 1998b work is the closest to our own, using a 10-sector dynamic CGE model to assess the effects of various policies designed to reduce the growth of CO 2 emissions. However, Zhang also assumes a completely marketized economy.
In the model described here we emphasize two features of the economy. First, our model is dynamic and tries to take into account the effects of population growth, capital accumulation, technology change, and changing patterns of demand. Second, we attempt to model the dual nature of the Chinese economy, whereby both plan and market institutions exist side by side.
Although the scope of the plan has been drastically reduced for most commodities, it still exists for some important energy goods, such as coal and oil.
2 In addition, capital markets are still largely under government control, either directly through the state budget or indirectly through the state-owned banking system.
In our simulations, we find that to reduce emissions by 5%, a unit carbon tax of about 9
yuan per ton (in 1992 yuan) would be required. This is equivalent to approximately a 7 percent tax on the price of coal. If a tighter emissions target is imposed, higher tax rates are required.
For a 10% reduction in every period, a unit carbon tax of 18 to 20 yuan per ton is required. The 1 Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (1997). 2 As of 1996, 79 percent of agricultural products, 93 percent of consumer goods, and 81 percent of industrial production materials were sold at market prices (China Price Yearbook Editorial Committee 1997). The remainder were sold at state-set or guidance prices (prices allowed to fluctuate within a narrow band).
effect of the imposition of the carbon tax, after the extra revenue raised is offset by a reduction in all other taxes, is to reduce household income and raise enterprise retained earnings. If there is no other offsetting government intervention, spending is shifted from consumption to investment.
The higher level of investment leads in turn to higher future output. Although subject to a number of caveats which we discuss later, in some sense there is a "double dividend," a decrease in emissions of CO 2 and an increase in GDP and consumption.
In the second section of this paper we briefly describe the modeling approach we have employed in this study. The third section gives a short description of the construction of the data base and the exogenous variables used in the model. Section four discusses the results of simulations where total emissions from fossil fuels are reduced through the imposition of carbon taxes. Some conclusions are given in section five. The model is presented in more detail in an appendix.
A Dynamic Economy-Energy-Environment Model for China
Large scale numerical models have been used to study the use of carbon taxes to attain given emissions targets for many countries. Some examples for the United States are the Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1992) and Goulder (1995a) models. Hoeller, Dean, and Hayafuji (1992) give a summary of the results of simulating carbon reductions using a number of models, including multi-regional models. However, with the exception of some of the work cited in the previous section, the potential costs of carbon reductions for China have not been as carefully studied as for developed country economies.
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Our model of the Chinese economy is somewhat similar in structure and scope to the Jorgenson and Wilcoxen model for the U.S., but we have tried to incorporate a number of special features of the Chinese economy. In contrast to models that use fixed coefficients and often produce high welfare costs when reducing emissions, our current model allows for substitution among the inputs (e.g. capital for energy, or oil for coal). Our model is formulated as a Solow growth model with exogenous savings rates. The growth of the economy is traced over time, taking into account population growth, capital accumulation, and technical change.
The agents in the model are: (i) households which supply labor inelastically, own part of the capital stock, and purchase goods and services; (ii) enterprises which produce commodities using inputs that are partly allocated through the plan and partly purchased in the market; (iii) the government which buys goods and services, imposes taxes, redistributes income, and sets down a central plan; and (iv) the foreign sector which purchases exports and supplies imports and foreign investment. The flow of payments among the various actors in the economy is summarized in the social accounting matrix (SAM) given in Figure 1 . (The SAM is described more fully in section three.)
The economy is divided into the 29 sectors listed in Table 1 . Our plan-market formulation follows the theoretical work of Byrd (1989) and Sicular (1988) and the static CGE implementation of Garbaccio (1994 Garbaccio ( , 1995 . For those commodities and factors of production with both a market and plan component, there is a division between the two tracks. A fixed amount of total output is sold at the plan price, while the remainder is sold on the market. The market price equates demand and supply for all commodities. Marginal decisions are made on the basis of the market prices while changes in plan prices and quantities are inframarginal. In a single period, for those sectors in which both tracks exist, the net effect of the plan allocations is to create lump sum transfers between producers and consumers. However, over time, the plan allocations do affect sectoral retained earnings and investment.
The factors of production in the model are capital, labor, land, energy, and other intermediates. Given the unavailability of sectoral time-series data, we use Cobb-Douglas production functions, with the coefficients changing over time so that there is both technical progress (more output with the same inputs) and biased technical change (changes in input demands unrelated to prices). This exogenous technical change is projected such that the Chinese input demands resemble the U.S. 1992 structure in 40 years.
The use of energy in China in recent years is discussed in Garbaccio, Ho, and Jorgenson (1998) . Using the 1987 and 1992 input-output tables, we show that recent declines in the energy-GDP ratio have been due mostly to a fall in the use of energy per unit of output at the sectoral (roughly 2-digit) level. By contrast, very little of the change in the energy-GDP ratio has been due to changes in the composition of output. This fall in energy use cannot be plausibly explained by changes in relative prices alone and should be largely attributed to technical change (or change in sectoral composition below the 2-digit level). Our projections of biased technical change allow for this trend to continue in the simulations.
The capital input for each industry consists of a plan component that is not mobile across sectors and a market component that is rented from a common capital stock. The capital stock evolves over time with new investment and depreciation. The labor input is mobile across sectors with the total supply projected using a population model. For two industries, agriculture and crude petroleum, "land" is an input and its supply is fixed exogenously.
Consumers derive income from wages, dividends, and transfers. They make purchases at both plan and market prices. The pattern of consumption demands changes over time (due to effects other than just changes in relative prices) and this is again projected using 1992 U.S. data.
Household savings are set as an exogenous share of income and form part of national savings together with enterprise retained earnings and (net) foreign investment. Savings are used for investment in domestic capital and to finance the government budget deficit.
The government imposes taxes on enterprise capital income, sales, and imports. On the expenditure side, the government buys goods, provides subsidies and investment grants, pays interest on government bonds, and makes transfer payments. The deficit is covered by domestic and foreign borrowing. The modeling of imports and exports follows the standard one-country treatment and the trade and current account deficits are set exogenously. The evolution of the stocks of domestic and foreign debts and interest payments are treated consistently.
Data and Exogenous Variables
The primary data set for the model is built around the official Chinese input-output tables for 1992. 4 The input-output tables have in turn been used to construct the SAM for the same year ( Figure 1) . The SAM provides a tabular snapshot of the economy for a single year. For each economic agent, there is a row that records incomes and a column that records expenditures. Our SAM allows for a distinction between commodities and activities (industries). Each activity can produce more than one commodity so that we can incorporate both the official USE (commodity by activity) and MAKE (activity by commodity) matrices. Table 1 .
The biggest end users of energy are the chemicals, building materials, and primary metals sectors.
Because the official input-output table includes only a single column of net exports, export and import data are assembled from Chinese customs statistics. Differences between the customs statistics data, which are in world prices, and the input-output table net exports, which are in domestic producer prices, are assumed to be the trade margins (both positive and negative)
of Chinese foreign trade corporations.
Turning to the exogenous variables, the sectoral labor force data were put together from various Chinese sources. Projections of the future labor force are calculated from World Bank (1990) as described in Ho, Jorgenson, and Perkins (1998) . The initial sectoral capital stock data are estimated using the depreciation allowances given in the input-output tables. The government deficit is set initially to current levels, but declines gradually to zero. The current account balance is set at a deficit initially, but declines to zero in 20 years. World prices of
Chinese imports are projected to be the same as in the base period, except for world oil prices which are taken from projections by the U.S. Department of Energy. Base exports grow initially at a rate of 8 percent, but the growth rate is projected to gradually slow over the next 40 years.
This growth rate is used for all goods except for oil exports which are set to zero growth. The productivity growth parameter ( µ j in the g(t) function in equation A3) is set such that the initial growth rate is 3 percent per annum, the rate estimated for the aggregate economy (see Ho, Jorgenson, and Perkins 1998) . Given the lack of industry level estimates, this rate is used for all sectors.
Carbon Taxes and Emissions
In this section we describe our simulations of the use of carbon taxes (taxes on fuels based on their carbon content) to control carbon emissions in China. Although China does not currently impose carbon taxes and is unlikely to do so in the near future, it should be noted that
China does have some history of using emissions charges in attempting to control the emissions of a number of pollutants, including air pollutants (NEPA 1992 , World Bank 1997 Change 1996). However, for China and other developing countries, which have much lower per capita emissions, there are strenuous objections to establishing these types of targets. Therefore, instead of focusing on stabilization, we look at the effects of reductions from a "business as usual" baseline level of carbon emissions.
To provide a useful picture of the economic impact of carbon taxes, we have chosen to simulate a range of uniform reductions. To do this we first run a base case with no emissions commodities. 6 As to the effectiveness of emissions charges in China, Wang and Wheeler (1996) note that for water pollutants, while some provinces lag behind, on the whole the current levy system is relatively effective and has been "accompanied by large reductions in water pollution." targets and no carbon taxes. In the base case, total carbon emissions in each period may be written as:
where QI it , X it , and M it are industry output, exports, and imports, respectively, of coal and oil and θ i is the emissions coefficient by fuel type.
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After establishing the base case, we then run alternative simulations where emissions of carbon dioxide are constrained to be a fraction (γ ) of the base case in every period:
All other exogenous variables and parameters are held constant. To achieve the carbon emissions target, we let the carbon tax be an endogenous variable which has the effect of raising the prices of coal and oil. 8 The imposition of the carbon tax raises additional revenue for the government. In order to keep the alternative simulations revenue neutral, we reduce all other taxes proportionately. With government deficits held constant, this means that we are keeping government spending the same as in the base case. To scale the original tax rates, we introduce an additional endogenous variable, λ t , into the alternative system such that:
where t t k is the capital income tax rate and t it t is the indirect tax rate for sector i. The sectoral indirect tax rates (net of subsidies) are provided in the last column of Table 1 . The government expenditure neutrality constraint is then set so that:
where GG is the quantity index of government purchases (equation A15 in the appendix). This keeps aggregate spending constant. The quantity of specific commodities purchased will, of course, change. To summarize, in the alternative simulations there are two additional equations, 7 Net imports of refined petroleum are also calculated and included in the total.
(2) and (4), and two additional endogenous variables, the tax rate per ton of carbon and λ . GG, an endogenous variable in the base case is made an exogenous variable in the alternative solutions. Tax rates on capital income, sales, and tariffs are made endogenous in the alternative cases.
We then compare the outcome of the alternative simulations with the base case solution.
Although our base case may be of independent interest, we do not focus on it in this paper. The base case levels of output, emissions, etc., are driven by the assumptions about the exogenous variables, such as the rates of population growth and technological change. In Ho, Jorgenson,
and Perkins (1998), we examined a number of plausible assumptions about the exogenous variables and produced a wide range of forecasts of the levels of output and emissions. Our assumptions about the exogenous variables in the current paper lead to fairly high average growth rates. In the base case, GDP rises at an average of 5.7 percent per year over the first 30
years. The growth rate is higher in the beginning but gradually declines as both population and productivity growth slow in the later years. The high rate of GDP growth leads to a high rate of growth of carbon emissions, averaging 3.8 percent per year over the first 30 years.
We ran three alternative scenarios: 5%, 10%, and 15% reductions in carbon emissions (i.e. γ = 0.95, 0.90, and 0.85). The impacts of these carbon reductions on some important variables are presented in Tables 2, 3 , and 4 and graphed in Figures 2 through 7. The base case levels of total carbon emissions and the levels for the 5%, 10%, and 15% reduction cases are shown in Figure 2 . 9 For each of the reduction scenarios, the percentage change in GDP relative to the base case is shown in Figure 3 . In all of the alternative scenarios, there is a very small decline in GDP in the 1st year. However, in each case, there is an increase in the level of GDP in every year thereafter. In the 15% carbon reduction case, by the 30th year of the simulation, the level of GDP has increased by almost 1 percent over the baseline.
The unit carbon tax rates calculated for the three emissions reductions cases are shown in Figure 4 . For the 5% emissions reduction case, a tax of about 9 yuan per ton of carbon is 8 See equations A4 and A12 in the appendix. 9 In the base case, carbon emissions in year 2032 are 2.16 billion tons. This figure is reduced by 5%, 10%, and 15% in the alternative simulations.
required in the 1st year of the simulation. 10 Increasing the percentage reduction in emissions requires a more than proportionate increase in the unit carbon tax. Offsetting the new revenue from the carbon tax is the reduction in all other taxes by the factor λ. The value for λ in each period is graphed in Figure 5 . Each of the other tax rates is reduced by about 1 percent in the simulation period for the 5% carbon reduction case and by approximately 3 to 4 percent in the 15% case.
The imposition of the carbon tax increases energy prices and this in turn leads to increases in the prices of other goods (relative to the numeraire, the nominal wage rate). A decline in the real wage results in a fall in household income and, in the first few years of the simulations, a decline in aggregate consumption. This is shown in Figure 6 . However, given our assumption that the labor supply in China is inelastic, the decline in the real wage does not have a distortionary effect on hours worked. At the same time, because of the offsetting reductions in enterprise taxes, enterprise retained earnings are increased. Households do not receive a similar benefit from the reduction in the taxes on labor income because these taxes are negligible in the base year. As shown in Figure 7 , the increase in retained earnings is transferred into an increase in investment. Over time, this increased investment results in an increase in total output. This shows up within a few years in an increase in consumption over the baseline in all of the carbon tax simulations.
We can now look at the effects on the individual primary energy sectors (see Tables 2, 3 , and 4). After the imposition of the sectoral carbon tax on coal, in the 1st year of the 5% reduction simulation the purchaser's (market) price of coal increases by 6.1 percent. Because of its lower carbon content, the imposition of the sectoral carbon tax on oil causes the purchaser's price of oil to rise by only 1.0 percent. The increase in the price of coal results in a 6.0 percent reduction in coal output. In the 1st year, oil sector output falls by 0.8 percent while imports of oil and refined petroleum both fall by about 2 percent. Overall, these changes lead to a fall in total primary energy use of 4.7 percent, slightly less than the 5 percent decline in total carbon emissions.
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Increasing the percentage reduction in carbon emissions requires a more than proportionate increase in sectoral carbon tax rates. For coal, the 5%, 10%, and 15% reductions in carbon emissions require, respectively, 6.1, 12.9, and 20.7 percent increases in coal prices in the 1st year. Similar disproportionate increases in prices are required for oil. As shown in Table 2 , this holds true for coal and oil in both the 1st and 30th years of the simulations.
The effects on other sectors are predictable. Changes in purchaser's (market) prices for the 1st year are given in Table 3 . Because of the rise in primary energy prices, sectors that use energy intensively experience proportionate price increases. For example in the 5% reduction scenarios, the price of electricity increases by 0.8 percent, building materials by 0.3 percent, and primary metals by 0.3 percent. Figures for changes in sectoral output are given in Table 4 . There are reductions in the output of electricity and refined petroleum. Agricultural output falls slightly because of the decline in demand due to the drop in real household income. At the same time, sectors that sell investment goods (transport equipment and construction) experience increases in demand and output.
Over time, as the GDP and capital stock rise relative to the base case, higher demand for energy requires that the carbon tax rates be increased in order to continue to achieve the same proportionate reduction in emissions. In the 5% carbon reduction case, this results in a 6.7 percent increase in the market price of coal in the 30th year compared to the 6.1 percent increase during the 1st year of the simulation (see Table 2 ). The effect is reversed for oil because of the assumed availability of oil imports at the projected world price. The assumption that government spending is fixed in real terms, coupled with an increasing tax base, results in the revenue from the carbon tax falling as a share of total revenue over time. In the 5% carbon reduction case, the share of revenue from the carbon tax falls from 1.2 percent in the 1st year to 0.6 percent in the 30th year. In the 15% reduction case, the share falls from 3.6 to 1.9 percent.
Two comments are in order on the pattern of carbon taxes over time in our model. The first concerns our assumptions about capital mobility. In the initial years of our simulations, the plan portion of capital dominates the total. The plan portion of capital is assumed to be immobile. Compared to models with completely mobile capital, this results in a much slower rate of substitution of capital for energy. Over time, the stock of mobile market capital rises in each industry and this results in more flexibility in later years. The second comment concerns the specification for the crude oil sector. The crude oil sector is one of two industries in the model with "land" (oil reserves) as an input and the quantity of domestic reserves is assumed fixed.
The domestic price of oil therefore rises relative to most other prices and imports of oil rise faster in the carbon tax simulations than in the base case. Alternative specifications, such as including exploration costs into our model or different assumptions about future world oil prices, could alter our results.
Finally, we should emphasize what our assumptions about the production functions and technical change imply. As discussed previously, the share coefficients are projected exogenously. This affects the level of energy use and has a major influence on the "business as usual" baseline solution. However, the percentage change in energy use induced by the imposition of carbon taxes is determined by the elasticity of substitution between the various inputs. These elasticities are constant in our production functions and are therefore identical in both the base case and carbon tax simulations. The percentage change in input demands is not determined by the value of the share coefficients. 
Conclusions
Our results paint a rather optimistic picture of the use of carbon taxes to induce a reduction in CO 2 emissions in China. Although the imposition of a carbon tax results in a fall in consumption in the first few years of our simulations, in all of the emissions reduction scenarios analyzed, GDP rises above the baseline level after the first year. Within a few years, increases in investment also lead to increases in consumption above the baseline. Since we do not use an intertemporal utility function, we do not calculate discounted consumption. However, it would take an extremely high discount rate to produce a loss in the aggregate.
and hydroelectricity. 12 This comment applies to the other exogenous variables in the model as well. A different rate of technical progress, for example, would lead to a different path for the base case. However, the percentage change in variables (like GDP) resulting from the imposition of a carbon tax, would be only marginally affected. Assuming a more rapid rate of liberalization of the plan elements would have income, but not price effects.
Recent work using analytical and computable general equilibrium models by Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Goulder (1995a) , Parry (1995) , Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) , Böhringer, Pahlke, and Rutherford (1997) and others have cast doubt on the likelihood of a "double dividend" from environmental taxation. A review of this evolving literature is beyond the scope of this paper. 13 However, it is possible to point out a number of reasons why our results differ and in fact do not contradict those obtained in these studies. First, we should emphasize that our main result comes about because of the shift from consumption to investment brought about indirectly through the imposition of the carbon tax. Although GDP increases in every year after the first year, it drops below the baseline in the first year of all of our carbon tax simulations.
Second, the most important element driving our results is our assumption that the labor supply in China is inelastic. With this specification, the fall in the real wage brought about by increases in goods prices has no distortionary effect on hours worked. The assumption of a positive labor supply elasticity is one of the key assumptions that leads to the rejection of the "double dividend"
hypothesis for developed country economies, but seems inappropriate in the context of China's transition economy. 14 Third, the fact that in China, taxes on labor are negligible means that households receive almost no benefit from the revenue neutral reduction in tax rates. This effect serves to further shift the burden of the carbon tax onto households. Fourth, most of the dynamic CGE models for developed economies have endogenously determined savings rates with perfect foresight, while the private savings rate in our model is exogenous (although not constant).
Enterprise savings are affected by the revenue neutral reduction in the enterprise income tax, but there is no price effect on retained earnings. Hence the passive rise in investment. Finally, other distortions, like the two-tier price system and highly differentiated net output tax rates on intermediate and final goods, leave open the possibility for many welfare enhancing reforms, which may relate only coincidentally to environmental objectives. 15 Given that carbon taxes have the effect of reducing subsidies and raising prices for energy goods, our results are 13 A good overview of the "double dividend" literature is given in Goulder (1995b) .
14 At this time we are aware of no study that has estimated a labor supply elasticity for China. However, we should note that allowing for an elastic labor supply in our model would require the inclusion of leisure in the welfare function. Given the development of labor markets in China and the high rate of unemployment, we do not believe that this would be a useful complication of the model. consistent with calls by the World Bank and others for China to increase efficiency by liberalizing energy markets.
Our results contrast with those of Zhang (1998a Zhang ( , 1998b While we believe that our model helps to point out how certain features of the Chinese economy may serve to ameliorate what might otherwise be negative consequences of the imposition of carbon taxes, a number of caveats are in order. First, the nature of the experiment is somewhat extreme. Consumers are not compensated while enterprises reap the full benefit of the revenue neutral reductions in tax rates. Also, given the underdevelopment of capital markets in China, one could certainly ask if the marginal efficiency of additional investment would be as high as is implied in our carbon tax simulations. Second, the cost of reducing emissions depends on the ability to substitute to alternative fuels or technologies. Our simple production functions are abstractions of much more complex current and future technologies. Although included implicitly in the production function for the electricity sector, a more detailed model might explicitly include hydro, nuclear, wind, and other non-carbon energy sources. In particular, our modeling of the electric power sector, as in most similar models, is very aggregated and may over or understate the degree of substitution possible. Finally, we do not take into account the very substantial environmental benefits, aside from the decrease in greenhouse gas emissions, that would likely accompany reductions in CO 2 emissions in China. We hope to deal with these and other issues in future work.
Zhang found a 1.47% decline in GDP in the 20th year. Unfortunately, a comparison of the same revenue recycling scenario is not available for the two multi-country models.
Appendix: Description of the Model
The main features of the dynamic economy-energy-environment model for China are discussed in this appendix. Further details are given in Garbaccio, Ho, and Jorgenson (1997a) .
We describe the modeling of each of the main agents in the model in turn. Table A1 lists a number of parameters and variables which are referred to with some frequently. In general, a bar above a symbol indicates that it is a plan parameter or variable. A tilde indicates that a symbol refers to a market variable. Symbols without markings are, in general, total quantities or average prices. To reduce unnecessary notation, whenever possible, we drop the time subscript, t, from our equations.
A.1. Production
Each of the 29 industries is assumed to produce its output using a constant returns to scale technology. For each sector j this can be expressed as:
where KD j , LD j , TD j , and A ij are capital, labor, land, and intermediate inputs, respectively.
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In sectors for which both plan and market allocation exists, output is made up of two components, the plan quota output ( QI j − ) and the output sold on the market ( QI j ). The plan quota output is sold at the state-set price ( PI j − ) while the output in excess of the quota is sold at the market price ( PI j ).
A more detailed discussion of how this plan-market formulation is different from standard market economy models is given in Garbaccio, Ho, and Jorgenson (1997b) . In summary, if the constraints are not binding, then the "two-tier plan/market" economy operates at the margin as a market economy with lump sum transfers between agents. The return to the owners of fixed capital in sector j is:
18 QI j denotes the quantity of industry j's output. This is to distinguish it from, QC j , the quantity of commodity j. In the actual model each industry may produce more than one commodity and each commodity may be produced by more than one industry. In the language of the input output tables, we make use of both the USE and MAKE matrices. For ease of exposition we ignore this distinction here.
For each industry, given the capital stock K j and prices, the first order conditions from maximizing equation A2, subject to equation A1, determine the market and total input demands.
Given the lack of a consistent time-series data set, in this version of the model, we use Cobb-Douglas production functions. Equation A1 for the output of industry j at time t then becomes: To allow for biased technical change, the α Ej coefficients are indexed by time and are updated exogenously. We set α Ej to fall gradually over the next 40 years while the labor coefficient, α Lj , rises correspondingly. The composition of the aggregate energy input (i.e. the coefficients α kj E ) are also allowed to change over time. These coefficients are adjusted gradually so that they come close to resembling the U.S. use patterns of 1992. The exception is that the Chinese coefficients for coal for most industries will not vanish as they have in the U.S. 
A.2. Households
The household sector derives utility from the consumption of commodities, is assumed to supply labor inelastically, and owns a share of the capital stock. It also receives income transfers and interest on its holdings of public debt. Private income after taxes and the payment of various non-tax fees (FEE), Y p , can then be written as:
where YL denotes labor income from supplying LS units of effective labor, less income taxes.
YL is equal to:
The relationship between labor demand and supply is given in equation A31 below. LS is a function of the working age population, average annual hours, and an index of labor quality:
Household income is allocated between consumption (VCC t ) and savings. In this version of the model we use a simple Solow growth model formulation with an exogenous savings rate ( s t ) to determine private savings ( S t p ):
use the input-output tables of developed countries including the U.S. We have considered making extrapolations based on recent Chinese input-output tables, but given the short sample period and magnitude of the changes in recent years, this did not seem sensible.
Household utility is a function of the consumption of goods such that:
Assuming that the plan constraints are not binding, then as in the producer problem above, given market prices and total expenditures, the first order conditions derived from equation A9 determine household demand for commodities, C i , where C C C i i i = +~. Here C i and C i are household purchases of commodities at state-set and market prices. The household budget can be written as:
We use a Cobb-Douglas utility function because we currently lack the disaggregated data to estimate an income elastic functional form. However, one would expect demand patterns to change with rising incomes and this is implemented by allowing the α it C coefficients to change over time. These future demand patterns are projected using the U.S. use patterns of 1992.
A.3. Government and Taxes
In the model, the government has two major roles. First, it sets plan prices and output quotas and allocates investment funds. Second, it imposes taxes, purchases commodities, and redistributes resources. Public revenue comes from direct taxes on capital and labor, indirect taxes on output, tariffs on imports, the carbon tax, and other non-tax receipts:
where D j is the depreciation allowance and X i and M i are the exports and imports of good i.
The carbon tax per unit of fuel i is:
where t x is the unit carbon tax calculated per ton of carbon and θ i is the emissions coefficient for each fuel type i.
Total government expenditure is the sum of commodity purchases and other payments:
Government purchases of specific commodities are allocated as shares of the total value of government expenditures, VGG. For good i:
We construct a price index for government purchases as log log PGG PS
. The real quantity of government purchases is then:
The difference between revenue and expenditure is the deficit, ∆G , which is covered by increases in the public debt, both domestic ( B ) and foreign ( B G* ): We model the structure of investment in a fairly simple manner. In the Chinese economy, some state-owned enterprises receive investment funds directly from the state budget and are allocated credit on favorable terms through the state-owned banking system. Non-state enterprises get a negligible share of state investment funds and must borrow at what are close to competitive interest rates. There is also a small but growing stock market that provides an alternative channel for private savings. We abstract from these features and define the capital stock in each sector j as the sum of two parts, which we call plan and market capital:
The plan portion evolves with plan investment and depreciation:
In this formulation, K j 0 is the capital stock in sector j at the beginning of the simulation. This portion is assumed to be immobile across sectors. Over time, with depreciation and limited government investment, it will decline in importance. Each sector may also "rent" capital from the total stock of market capital,
The allocation of market capital to individual sectors, K jt , is based on sectoral rates of return.
As in equation A2, the rental price of market capital by sector is P In two sectors, agriculture and crude petroleum, "land" is a factor of production. We have assumed that agricultural land and oil fields are supplied inelastically, abstracting from the complex property rights issues regarding land in China. After taxes, income derived from plan capital, market capital, and land is either kept as retained earnings by the enterprises, distributed as dividends, or paid to foreign owners:
where tax k ( ) is total direct taxes on capital (the first term on the right hand side of equation A11).
20
As discussed below, total investment in the model is determined by savings. This total, VII, is then distributed to the individual investment goods sectors through fixed shares, α it I :
Like the α it C coefficients in the consumption function, the investment coefficients are indexed by time and projected using U.S. patterns for 1992. A portion of sectoral investment, I t , is allocated directly by the government, while the remainder, Ĩ t , is allocated through other channels. 21 The total, I t , can be written as: 
20 In China, most of the "dividends" are actually income due to agricultural land. 21 It should be noted that the industries in the Chinese accounts include many sectors that would be considered public goods in other countries. Examples include local transit, education, and health.
A.5. The Foreign Sector
Trade flows are modeled using the method followed in most single-country models.
Imports are considered to be imperfect substitutes for domestic commodities and exports face a downward sloping demand curve. We write the total supply of commodity i as a CES function of the domestic ( QI i ) and imported good ( M i ): 
A.6. Markets
The economy is in equilibrium in period t when the market prices clear the markets for the 29 commodities and the two factors. The supply of commodity i must satisfy the total of intermediate and final demands:
For the labor market, we assume that labor is perfectly mobile across sectors so there is one average market wage which balances supply and demand. As is standard in models of this type, we reconcile this wage with the observed spread of sectoral wages using wage distribution coefficients, ψ jt L . Each industry pays PL PL jt jt L t = ψ for a unit of labor. The labor market equilibrium is then given as:
For the non-plan portion of the capital market, adjustments in the market price of capital, P j KD , clears the market in sector j:
where ψ jt K converts the units of capital stock into the units used in the production function. The rental price PT j adjusts to clear the market for "land":
, where j = "agriculture" and "petroleum extraction."
In this model without foresight, investment equals savings. There is no market where the supply of savings is equated to the demand for investment. The sum of savings by households, businesses (as retained earnings), and the government is equal to the total value of investment plus the budget deficit and net foreign investment:
The budget deficit and current account balance are fixed exogenously in each period. The world relative price (e) adjusts to hold the current account balance at its exogenously determined level. Table 1 Sectoral Characteristics for China, 1992 
